The Impact of Incorporation—Double Jeopardy and the States: Benton v. Maryland by Console, June E.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1970
The Impact of Incorporation—Double Jeopardy
and the States: Benton v. Maryland
June E. Console
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
June E. Console, The Impact of Incorporation—Double Jeopardy and the States: Benton v. Maryland, 3 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 414 (1970).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol3/iss2/14
THE IMPACT OF INCORPORATION-
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE STATES:
BENTON v. MARYLAND 1
The degree to which specific provisions of the Bill of Rights will pro-
tect criminal defendants in state prosecutions has long been an area of con-
troversy. During the first half of the twentieth century the Court's position
was that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause2 functioned as a
natural-law formula, invalidating state action, without regard to the specific
language of the first ten amendments, only when such action, on the facts of
a particular case, was "shocking to a universal sense of justice" or resulted in
"a denial of fundamental fairness". In 1961, with Mapp v. Ohio,4 the
Court began a departure from this doctrine, viewing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a reference to the Bill of Rights, absorbing certain amendment
guarantees to make federal standards of protection applicable against state
violation.5 The instant case provides yet another forum for these competing
positions within the framework of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause."
Petitioner, John Dalmer Benton, was tried in a Maryland state court on
charges of burglary and larceny. Though acquitted of larceny, he was
convicted of burglary and sentenced to ten years in prison. Subsequent to
filing notice of appeal, and prior to a hearing, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decided Schowgurow v. Maryland,7 invalidating a section of that state's
constitution requiring grand and petit jurors to affirm a belief in God.
Thereafter, Benton's case was remanded to the trial court to determine
whether he wished to take advantage of the relief afforded under the Schow-
gurow decision. Benton exercised his option to have the original indictment
declared invalid, and he was again charged with both larceny and burglary.
He objected to the larceny count on the basis that retrial for that offense
would violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The lower
1 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "... nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
3 Courts have used varying terminology. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 395 U.S. at 808 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V: ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
7 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
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court denied petitioner's motion to set aside this count. Benton was then
tried and convicted of both offenses and given concurrent sentences-fifteen
years for burglary and five years for larceny.
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the trial court
conviction was affirmed. After the Court of Special Appeals denied review,
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. Justice Marshall,
in a six-two opinion, held that as the Double Jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment was applicable to the states, Maryland's action of conditioning
petitioner's appeal on a surrender of his former acquittal for a different offense
was invalid. Prior to a decision on the merits, however, the Court was
faced with the contention that the existence of concurrent sentences consti-
tuted a jurisdictional bar to federal review.
It is clear that where a defendant is convicted of two criminal offenses,
an allegation that constitutional rights were violated as to each is sufficient
to constitute a case or controversy, and thus avoid the Article m]1 8 jurisdic-
tional bar in federal actions. As stated in Muskrat v. United States,9 a case
or controversy includes "the claims of litigants . . . for the protection
or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of
wrongs."'-0 In this context it is the mere fact of conviction which supplies
jurisdiction-the sentence or time in custody is irrelevant."
Where the sentences imposed are to run consecutively, and the defendant
raises constitutional objections to either conviction, it is likewise evident that
jurisdiction exists. 12  The rationale for granting a present right to review
where the conviction appealed precedes the other is that, although reversal
will not result in release from confinement, the effect of denying an im-
mediate appeal would be that the former conviction could not be challenged
until after it was served.' 3  Thus, in retrospect, a case or controversy does
8 U.S. CoNsr. art. Im, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . -to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies between two or more
States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -between Citizens of
different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
9 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
10 Id. at 357.
11 It is evident that the mere release of a prisoner does not automatically terminate
consideration of his case. The Court has adjudicated the merits of criminal cases in
which the sentence has Veen fully served or where the probationary period in which a
suspended sentence can be reimposed has lapsed. See Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Fiswick
v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
12 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335
(1968).
13 See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968).
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exist. Where the conviction appealed carries a sentence which is to be
served subsequent to an unattacked conviction and sentence, the rationale is
similar.14 Were adjudication on the merits to delay, perhaps for decades,
the defendant could very well be substantially prejudiced; evidence would
become "cold", witnesses may become unobtainable, and in any event, the
defendant would still be in custody during the time of appeal.1' Thus
postponement of an adjudication on the merits, even where the defendant
attacks a sentence he has not yet begun to serve, "lessens the probability
that the final disposition of the case will do substantial justice." 10
However, where concurrent sentences are given, and petitioner appeals
but one,17 courts have maintained inconsistent positions.18 When the length-
ier sentence was challenged, the rationale of the consecutive sentence cases
was applied, as the length of the defendant's future imprisonment was at
stake.19 Upon an attack of the lesser sentence, however, courts have relied
without discussion upon precedent stemming from Claassen v. United
States,20 which approved English decisions that "if there is any one count
It is clear that federal collateral attack may not be utilized. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1964) provides in part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State . . . . (emphasis added.)
In Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) the Court ruled that if a habeas corpus
petition was filed while the defendant was in custody, it would still fulfill the re-
quirements of this statute even though he were released from custody when the
petition was ultimately heard. But, in Eldridge v. Peyton, 295 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Pa.
1968), the court held that when a habeas corpus petition was filed after the defendant
had been released from custody, the federal courts under this statute lacked juris-
diction.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) is also in point, stating, "A prisoner in custody ... may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
(emphasis added.)
14 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
15 This list is not meant as exhaustive of all possible consequences. The author
recognizes that other problems, such as lost records, could develop to impede the
opportunity of a fair trial upon delayed review. Further, not only the petitioner,
but the state as well could be prejudiced. If evidence becomes "cold" the state may
not have the means to reprosecute.
16 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968).
17 The problem arises not only in the case of multiple convictions, but also where
a sentence rests upon multiple counts. If any one of the counts is valid, it is con-
sidered sufficient in itself to sustain the sentence, and thereby precludes challenging
the validity of the other counts. Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
18 395 U.S. 784, 789 (1969) citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115
(1959); and Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 n.6 (1957) as examples.
19 Where the concurrent prison terms are fifteen years and five years, a denial of
petitioner's challenge to the five year count leaves the longer sentence in effect. Thus,
a challenge of the five year count, even if successful, would not result in reducing
the period of petitioner's detention.
20 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
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to support the verdict, it shall stand good, not withstanding all the rest
are bad."1
21
Analogies to this doctrine have been invoked in American law as a juris-
dictional bar to a consideration of convictions carrying concurrent sentences.
The rationale is that one valid conviction and sentence precludes the neces-
sity (or value) in challenging the other, as the defendant, in any event, would
still remain incarcerated under the longer sentence. The question before
the Court in Benton, prior to an adjudication on the merits, was whether this
concurrent sentence doctrine precluded the existence of a live case or con-
troversy suitable for resolution.
Acknowledging that this area of law was in a state of flux, and that the
concurrent sentence doctrine had been haphazardly applied, the Court held
that "there [was] no jurisdictional bar to consideration of challenges to mul-
tiple convictions, even though concurrent sentences were imposed," 22 as the
existence of a valid concurrent sentence itself did not "remove the elements
necessary to create a justiciable case or controversy." 23  In reaching this
decision the Court relied heavily upon Sibron v. New York.24
Sibron involved a challenge to a state court conviction heard by the Su-
preme Court after petitioner had completed his sentence. The state alleged
that because defendant was no longer in custody, the case had become moot,
and thus the Court lacked Article M jurisdiction. In denying this conten-
tion, the Court held that "a criminal case is moot only if . . . there is no
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the
basis of the challenged conviction."25 (emphasis added.)
This was not a novel statement; it had been alluded to in prior decisions. 26
The significance lies, however, in the cases that were quoted with approval,
which denied mootness where the adverse consequences were at best remote.
In Ginsberg v. New York,27 the unlikely possibility that a Commissioner
might use his discretionary power to prevent the petitioner from operating a
luncheonette, because of a previous obscenity conviction, was sufficient to
provide jurisdiction. In Fiswick v. United States28 the same result obtained
where an alien was subject to possible deportation for having committed a
crime involving "moral turpitude", despite the fact that his crime was never
21 Id. at 146.
22 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969).
23 Id. at 790.
24 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
25 Id. at 57.
20 See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957) (possibility of consequences
collateral to the sentence justifies considering the merits of the case); United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (convict possibly subject to higher sentence as a
recidivist in state court due to prior federal conviction).
27 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
28 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
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held or suggested to fall within that category. Thus as Sibron's convic-
tion could be used to impeach his testimony in future judicial proceedings, or
place him under the sanction of a recidivist statute, these and other possible
adverse consequences stemming from a conviction established a case or con-
troversy.
The rationale of Sibron compelled the decision that the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine could not function as a jurisdictional bar. The collateral ef-
fects in Benton consisted not of imprisonment, but of the non-custodial
consequences of conviction. Recognizing the vital importance of keeping
open avenues of judicial review of deprivation of constitutional rights, the
Court, by upholding jurisdiction, thus maintained its policy emanating from
Fay v. Noia,29 that "finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to de-
feat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of per-
sonal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review."1
30
While the Court negated the existence of the concurrent sentence doc-
trine as a jurisdictional bar, it did not decide whether that doctrine had con-
tinuing validity as a rule of judicial convenience. The Court determined
that even were it retained as a discretionary rule, sufficient factors existed
in the instant case as not to warrant an application of discretion. In the
opinion the Court enunciated no express rule for determining whether to
apply discretion. The outlines of such a rule, however, may be ascertained
by an examination of the various factors considered by the Court.
In addition to the recidivism and impeachment aspects, the majority re-
lied on the fact that the Maryland court had not applied the concurrent
sentence doctrine and had reached the double jeopardy question. This
may have indicated a state interest in the larceny conviction, and as the
importance of a conviction would rest upon Maryland law, the Court gave
weight to the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The Court further
noted that were the burglary conviction successfully appealed, or the sentence
reduced, Benton would have a right to review. 31 The Court also reiterated
the Sibron statement concerning the preferability of determining possible
constitutional violations on direct review.
This textual discussion is analogous to that provided in Sibron and the
decision appears to adopt that rationale as the test for determining the use
of discretion. Yet it is then questionable that the Court would fail to decide
that the concurrent sentence doctrine on direct review did not even retain
validity as a rule of judicial discretion. The impact of Sibron is that unless
no collateral harm can be foreseen (in theory or in fact), jurisdiction exists.
The analogy here would be that unless no collateral harm can be foreseen,
29 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
30 Id. at 424.
81 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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discretion will not be exercised. The effect, sub silentio, should be therefore,
that where the Court has jurisdiction on direct appeal, as any conviction
may adversely affect the defendant, discretion may not be expressed.
Justice White, who concurred, and Justices Harlan and Stewart, who dis-
sented, believed that the concurrent sentence doctrine had continuing va-
lidity as a rule of judicial convenience. It was unimportant that Maryland
had reached the double jeopardy issue, in that, "this Court has never re-
garded itself as bound to reach the constitutional issue merely because the
court below did so, and has often declined to pass upon constitutional
questions even though fully canvassed by the lower court.' '32 Justice Harlan
further argued for strict adherence to the Court's practice of refraining from
passing on constitutional questions in advance of necessity. The justification
for applying the doctrine was that the unreviewed count results in no
immediate harm to the petitioner. Regardless of the decision, Benton
would still be incarcerated on the valid count. Viewing the probability of
reduction of the burglary sentence as "manifestly negligible",3 3 other pos-
sible adverse collateral effects were considered as equally remote.3 4 The
dissent argued that only a few states would use the larceny conviction
against Benton for purposes of sentencing him as a habitual offender,
especially where he already had a record of three felony convictions.3 5
32 395 U.S. 784, 806-07 (1969).
33 Id. at 804 n.6.
34 As further support, Justice Harlan rejected petitioner's contention that the burglary
conviction was tainted by the introduction of evidence admissible solely to prove the
larceny charge. The majority did not consider the taint question in the context
of discretion under the concurrent sentence doctrine. Rather, it viewed the determina-
tion of the issue as requiring a remand to the state court. Not sufficiently familiar
with Maryland substantive and evidentiary law, the Court was unable to determine
if the jury had been prejudiced by evidence introduced in the joint trial of larceny
and burglary which would have been inadmissible under state law in a trial for burglary
alone.
Justice Harlan's review of the Maryland criminal procedure lead him to conclude
that
petitioner's acquittal of larceny at his first trial may have rested solely upon
that jury's unique view of the law concerning that offense, and cannot be taken
as having necessarily "determined" any particular question of fact. 395 U.S.
at 804.
Under the Maryland constitution the jury is judge of both law and fact. (MD. CONST.
art. XV, § 5.) Therefore it is necessary to examine the trial record as well as
Maryland procedure to determine upon which basis the conviction was held not to be
tainted by evidence introduced on the larceny count. The converse of Justice Harlan's
reasoning is just as plausible-the acquittal may have rested on facts actually litigated
and determined. Further, the fact that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found it
necessary to consider the double jeopardy question indicated that a larceny conviction
itself may carry collateral consequences of importance to a petitioner in Maryland.
Thus it cannot be conclusively decided, without further inquiry into the record of the
lower court, that there are no appreciable collateral effects adverse to Benton as a
result of the larceny count.
35 395 U.S. at 805.
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Further, the identical origin of these two convictions would, in all likelihood,
reduce the impact of the larceny conviction to negligible proportions.
This argument, however, fails to adequately conform with the rationale of
Sibron. While Sibron ostensibly focused on the observable adverse collateral
legal effects upon the specific individual defendant, that portion can be read
as superfluous. The Court there clearly reiterated its stance in Pollard v.
United States.30 Pollard did not detail the adverse effects upon the defend-
ant and yet stated that "[t]he possibility of consequences collateral to the
imposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with
the merits."137 The inference, which the Sibron court cited with approval,
was that "the obvious fact of life [is] that most criminal convictions do in
fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. The mere 'possibility' that
this will be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case. .. .
Further, when considering the specific consequences for the specific in-
dividual, Sibron itself discussed the effect of numerous previous convictions.
The Court stated:
It is impossible for this Court to say at what point the number of convictions on
a man's record renders his reputation irredeemable. And even if we believed that
an individual had reached that point, it would be impossible for us to say that
he had no interest in beginning the process of redemption with the particular case
sought to be adjudicated. We cannot foretell what opportunities might present
themselves in the future for the removal of other convictions from an individual's
record.3 9
Justice White, in a different context, approved retaining the concurrent
sentence doctrine as a valuable discretionary tool, balancing the interest of
the Court in avoiding an overcrowded docket against petitioner's interest in
obtaining an immediate appeal. He found merit in seeking to avoid delays,
in other cases, caused by the need for added time for review of concurrent
counts. "This is not a rule of convenience to the judge, but rather of fairness
to other litigants' '40 as more pressing claims may then be heard. The
premise is that the unreviewed count has no immediate importance. This
does not exclude the possibility that the situation may change at some future
time. As Justice White suggested, if adverse collateral effects do become a
reality, "the lack of earlier review can be cured by then supplying the
convict the review to which he would earlier have been entitled but for his
concurrent sentence on another count."
' 41
It is questionable, however, whether this is an adequate rationale upon
which to base a discretionary rule. Problems are discernable if a later re-
view is utilized in an effect to "cure" the harm of an allegedly invalid con-
36 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
37 Id. at 358.
38 392 U.S. at 55.
39 Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
40 395 U.S. at 799.
41 Id. at 800.
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viction. The reality of collateral effects would, in most cases, occur after the
permitted time for appeal. And if petitioner had been released, he would
then also lose the ability to bring a federal habeas corpus action. 42  Thus
the only relief open would be in the judicial proceeding which was the
cause of the reality of the harm. Were this in another state, the difficulties in
litigating an evidentiary problem, perhaps with competent witnesses thou-
sands of miles distant, are both apparent and undesirable. The Court in
Sibron, was also faced with the contention that litigation should await the
time when possible collateral effects ripen into actuality. The rejoinder of
that Court was that:
It is always preferable to litigate a matter when it is directly and principally
in dispute, rather than in a proceeding where it is collateral to the central contro-
versy .... And it is far better to eliminate the source of a potential legal
disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequences
of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time before he can secure
adjudication of the State's right to impose it on the basis of some past action.
43
The possible adverse effects of a postponed review presented Justice
White with no irreconcilable difficulties. He noted that as a cold and stale
record is inherent in appellate review, defendants would not be prejudiced
by allowing the record to become "colder". Should such prejudice result,
however, he characterized it merely as an "unfortunate byproduct of an
initially crowded docket."
44
This too appears unacceptable. In addition to the reasons stated in Si-
bron, the same rationale utilized in denying the existence of the concurrent
sentence doctrine as a jurisdictional bar is applicable. Witnesses may die or
forget facts, records may be lost-a host of adverse effects loom across the
horizon. Governmental interests in the protection of society could also suf-
fer. The case may be subsequently reversed, and necessary witnesses may
not then be present or able to testify in convicting the guilty.
In light of the above considerations, the essence of the majority opinion is
that a defendant who alleges that the state, in obtaining a conviction, acted in
such a manner as to violate certain constitutionally mandated safeguards, has
a right to confront the state with that violation and demand redress. To
hold otherwise would be contrary to any notion of constitutional justice.
The press of judicial business, the relative density of cases on the docket, the
efficacious employment of judicial resources-each rationale is deemed un-
worthy to prevent adjudication of constitutional guarantees. The effect is
to preclude from the state, an opportunity, within the technicalities of sen-
tencing procedures, to violate fundamental rights with impunity. By reject-
ing the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court was able to reach a decision
on the merits.
42 See discussion concerning habeas corpus supra, n.13.
43 392 U.S. at 56-57.
44 395 U.S. at 800.
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The Fifth Amendment requires that no person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense. The purpose of this Fifth Amendment provision has
been seen, by the Supreme Court, as a protection from:
[Riepeated attempts [by the state with all its resources] to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, [resulting in] embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.4"
Once the individual has been acquitted, he cannot be prosecuted again
for the same charge, unless such acquittal has been set aside on appeal.
However, it is generally conceded that an individual may be tried again for
the same offense where a verdict against him is set aside on his motion
and a new trial is granted. The underlying rationale, as stated in Green v.
United States,46 is that by his voluntary consent the appellant has foregone
his plea of former jeopardy by asking that the conviction be set aside.
Green, however, was a federal case, in which the defendant, although
indicted and tried for first degree murder, was convicted instead of second
degree murder. He appealed and the conviction was reversed. On re-
mand, Green was again tried for first degree murder. The Supreme Court
held that an appeal of one offense cannot be conditioned on a coerced sur-
render of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense.47 Such pro-
cedure was declared to be "a forfeiture in plain conflict with the consti-
tutional bar against double jeopardy. ' 48 Thus, the appeal of his erroneous
conviction did not constitute a valid waiver as it rested upon surrender of a
plea of former jeopardy on a different offense for which he was acquitted
and which was not related to his appeal.
Upon this rationale, were Benton a federal case, it is clear that the de-
fendant could not be subject to retrial for larceny. While it is evident that
rights may be waived, "waiver" necessarily recognizes the element of free
choice. 49 Such is non-existent here, for the petitioner must either forfeit his
protection against double jeopardy or lose his opportunity to appeal. This
situation is analogous to that of United States v. Tateou0 which sug-
gested that under a conditioned appeal, "waiver" becomes merely a "concep-
tual abstraction". 51 As the former indictment could only be set aside by
accepting the option of a new trial, it seems "only voidable . . . not
absolutely void."' 52 (emphasis added.) The fact that the original indictment
45 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
46 Id. at 189.
47 Id. at 193-94.
48 Id. at 194.
49 "Waiver" is the "intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right; . . . or
when one dispenses with the performance of something he is entitled to exact." BLACK'S
LAw DICnONARY 1751 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
50 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
51 Id. at 466.
52 395 U.S. at 797. Maryland contended that as the original indictment was in-
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was itself invalid does not mean that petitioner was never placed in jeopardy.
The defendant had a valid double jeopardy plea which, according to Green,
"he cannot be forced to waive."153 A contrary result would give the privilege
efficacy in theory only. This in essence was the decision of the majority in
Benton-federal standards applied and under the rationale of Green, upon
retrial, petitioner suffered a breach of his Fifth Amendment Double Jeop-
ardy privilege.
Benton, however, was a state court decision. This is a factor of signifi-
cance in the historical development of American constitutional law. Previ-
ously the Court had declared that the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause, as part of the Bill of Rights, was originally drafted for protection
solely against federal encroachment, and was not intended as a restriction
on state action.5 4  In this vacuum different standards emerged. Questions
which would have been determined under the Double Jeopardy Clause in
federal courts, were instead to be controlled in state courts under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Palko v. Connecticut55 well
illustrates this previous approach.
Palko, on facts similar to Green, although indicted for first degree murder,
was convicted instead of murder in the second degree. After a successful ap-
peal by the state, Palko objected that the new trial for first degree murder
placed him twice in jeopardy.rs The Supreme Court, in reviewing this con-
tention, held that the Double Jeopardy protection against federal prosecu-
tions was not made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Petitioner's only relief therefore was under the Due Process Clause,
which required that he not be subject to "a hardship so acute and shock-
ing that our polity will not endure it.' '57 Under this clause, the question be-
came whether state action violated "fundamental principles of liberty and
valid, the petitioner had never been in "former jeopardy" and thus could not avail
himself of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy provision. Characterizing the
indictment as voidable rather than void, as his sentence would have been served had
he not appealed, the Court cited to United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896),
for its holding that a technically invalid indictment is sufficient to constitute jeopardy.
An opposite result would "allow the Government to allege its own error to deprive
the defendant of the benefit of an acquittal by a jury." Id. at 797.
63 395 U.S. at 797.
54 Warren, The New "Liberty" Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAv. L. REv.
431, 440 (1925).
55 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
56 It is the general rule that "jeopardy" does not attach until a jury has been
empaneled. As noted in Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 1948):
[Aln accused is in jeopardy within the meaning of the guaranty against double
jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States when he is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction ... and a
jury has been empaneled and sworn; and where the case is tried to the court
without the intervention of a jury, jeopardy attaches when the court begins the
hearing of evidence.
57 302 U.S. at 328.
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justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.!' 8
Palko then attempted to define the test as "the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty."59
In Palko the contention was that the state was prejudiced by trial court
errors. Retrial of Palko thus was not a denial of fundamental fairness as
the state had a legitimate interest in prosecuting the appeal. Where there is
error of law to the prejudice of the state, societal interests in convicting the
guilty are deemed sufficient to justify such an appeal. °0 In Palko the state
asked merely for a trial free from error-the reciprocal privilege of the ac-
cused's right to review. The Court in Palko concluded: "Few would be so
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without [the right to indictment and jury trial
being afforded petitioner on the facts of that case]."61  The dissent in
Benton declined to part from the Palko rationale, characterizing it as one
of the Court's truly great decisions. The question thus concerned the possible
state interests to be served in conditioning Benton's burglary appeal upon
waiver of a valid acquittal on the previous larceny charge.
The defect in Benton's first trial was not a substantive legal error, but was
rather a procedural one. Justice Harlan noted that not only did the state
not appeal, in contrast to Palko, but that the trial itself was free from any
prejudicial error. The unconstitutional selection of the grand jury did not
affect Benton's subsequent acquittal. He acknowledged the fact that when
a fair trial results in an acquittal, the defendant's interest in repose must have
priority as a "principal of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."8 2  Therefore, the dissent
emphasized, the state's interest in forcing a second trial on the acquitted
larceny count was no greater than in the obviously impermissible "retrying
[of] any other person declared innocent after an error-free trial."08 (emphasis
added.) Retrying the petitioner merely on the burglary count, the crime of
which he had been previously convicted, would have been sufficient to serve
society's interests. Thus, while Benton and Palko were factually distinguish-
able, it should be noted that the majority result in Benton was also reached
by the dissent under the Palko "shock-the-conscience" or "fundamental
fairness" test.
Benton's retrial on the larceny count did effect a denial of due process, un-
der either the state or federal standards. The question thus arises as to
why the split on the Court then occurred. Insofar as the same result was
reached under Palko, what was the significance of the Court's action in
58 Id. quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
59 Id. at 325.
00 395 U.S. at 812.
61 302 U.S. at 325.
62 395 U.S. at 810, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
03 395 U.S. at 813.
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choosing to overrule it?
The split results from differing interpretations, both literal and philosophi-
cal, of the function of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The dissent followed the "shock-the-conscience" or "fundamental fairness"
test through which the Fourteenth Amendment functions as a natural-law
formula, restricting state violations of fundamental propriety under the con-
cept of due process. In contrast, the majority utilized what has come to be
known as the "theory of incorporation ' 64 in which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause is construed to encompass specific Bill of Rights
guarantees and uphold their integrity against state violation. Rather than ar-
gue, as would the dissent, that a state law restricting expression violates
fundamental fairness and inherent justice, in short, a vital liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, the majority might state that this very same
clause "incorporates" the specific First Amendment rights of free speech
and assembly, and makes its provisions applicable to the states.6 5
It may be, as in the instant case, that either use of the Due Process Clause
will provide the same result. Yet, since Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, the Su-
preme Court has rejected the fundamental fairness test in favor of incor-
poration.6 6 Thus the theory underlying Palko had been tacitly rejected prior
to Benton. The dispute, however, still exists, occasioned by the differences,
both practical and theoretical, that each may portend for the American
system.
Under the Palko rationale, state sovereignty and the inherent police
power of a state was strongly recognized. Under the then prevalent con-
cept of federalism, the state had primary responsibility for defining and
prosecuting crimes.6 7 As the federal system was somewhat remote from
particular state problems, it was evident that necessary procedural differ-
ences did and should exist between state and federal law. The state could
thus structure its systems for dealing with local problems free of all federal
constitutional restrictions, save those specifically directed against state ac-
tion. Primary among these was "pure" due process which the Fourteenth
Amendment, without more, imposed.
64 While this language is common usage the majority has never used the specific
term "incorporate".
65 E.g. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
66 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial in criminal cases); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963) (Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and
seizures); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in criminal cases).
67 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 189, 195 (1959).
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This requirement could be and was met in part, by utilizing different
procedures than those inherent in the Bill of Rights as restrictions on the
federal government. State law, aside from the influence of common de-
velopment, could thus, within the confines of due process, radically alter, or
even fail to provide for, a counterpart to specific amendment mandates. As
the state was left free to experiment within this immediate area of, for ex-
ample, criminal procedure, the ultimate effect was a grant to each state, ex-
cept where such action violated the fundamental fairness of due process, to
provide for its own separate and distinct Bill of Rights.
It is this concept of federalism which Justice Harlan, as spokesman for the
fundamental fairness doctrine, wishes to retain. He views the incorporation
theory as culminating in an erosion of federalism, in that it effectively de-
nies any role for state governments by making federal constitutional and
case law preeminent in the field.05 This assumes, however, that all specific
Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated, and that the full panoply of fed-
eral standards emanating from each amendment is applied. It can be seen
however, that this is not the case.
It is significant to note the degree to which the Court has employed the
incorporation doctrine. A theory of total incorporation of all the Bill of
Rights, though often argued, has never generated great support among mem-
bers of the Court. 9 Rather, the Court has chosen to judge each amend-
ment as it comes into issue. This theory of "selective" or "partial" incor-
poration does not therefore bind the Court to apply each amendment re-
striction in advance of necessity or in absence of proper consideration. Thus
where a specific amendment guarantee, supported by case or controversy
jurisdiction, is brought into question, the Court examines whether that spe-
cific right alone is "fundamental". If so, incorporation follows, and that
right is applicable per se to the states without regard to whether the specific
facts of that case "shock the conscience". 70
68 Justice Harlan has consistently remained opposed to incorporation of the amend-
ments. See his opinions in the following cases: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171
(1968) (dissenting); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (con-
curring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (concurring); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (dissenting); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963)
(concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (dissenting).
69 See Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68 (1947). As the foremost advocate of total incorporation, Justice Black proposes that
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the entire Bill of Rights provisions directly applicable
to the states. This theory is diametrically opposed to Justice Harlan's position that the
states may provide a fair trial under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by methods other than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The
Court, as evidenced in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and again in
Benton, has chosen a middle road between Justices Harlan and Black by incorporating
those amendments "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." id. at 149.
70 The Palko rationale, on the other hand, looks to the specific facts of the case
without regard to the right involved. Thus, it would be possible to hold that on the
Dissenting in Duncan v. Louisiana,71 where the defendant was denied a
jury trial, Justice Harlan rejected "selective" as well as total incorporation.
72
He feared that either theory will eventually result in "incorporating" the Bill
of Rights into the Due Process Clause.73 This had not yet occurred, although
a significant number of the amendments have been applied against the states.74
In all probability, the end result will not be the same if the amendments are
absorbed on a piece-meal basis through selective incorporation rather than
under total incorporation.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that it cannot restrict state power
to deal with local crime without a close examination of the individual state's
problems and experience. Illustrative of this is the fact that the states have
not been required to follow federal standards with regard to the Fifth
Amendment provision for Grand Jury Indictment.75 This provision had
been litigated and remains unincorporated; 76 a majority of states now pro-
vide that criminal proceedings may be commenced by the filing of an "in-
formation".
77
Other provisions when litigated may similarly remain outside the scope
of incorporation. There is nothing in Benton itself that indicates the Court's
view on this mater has shifted. As that Court stated:
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the
American scheme of justice,' . . . the same constitutional standards [that is, in the
sense of the privilege itself rather than the method of enforcement] apply against
both the State and Federal Governments. 78 (emphasis added.)
The reference to a "particular" guarantee supports the inference that "partial"
incorporation has not been surplanted.
Assuming however, that incorporation did lead to total absorption of the
Bill of Rights, is the threat to state sovereignty as real as the dissent would
suggest? In Duncan the fear of encroachment upon state sovereignty
stemmed specifically from the danger that not only would the particular
amendment be enforced upon the state, but so also would the entire body
of procedural law surrounding that prohibition.79 The implication is that
if a particular amendment is considered a fundamental constitutional right,
one which cannot be encroached upon by the state, an extension of that
facts of two different cases, one defendant should be benefitted by an extention of an
analogous guarantee while the other defendant would be denied.
71 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
72 Id. at 174-76.
78 395 U.S. at 808.
74 See cases collected supra note 65.
75 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of Grand Jury... ,
76 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
77 C. PnrrcHTT, THE AmFmRcN CONsTrrUrON 633 (2d ed. 1968).
78 395 U.S. at 795.
79 391 U.S. at 158 n.30.
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decision could result in further imposing upon the state the federal standards
of enforcement, arguably essential ingredients of the incorporated amend-
ment.
It is questionable, however, whether federal standards would be forced upon
the states to create one uniform body of procedural law regulating the area
of the incorporated amendment. Although there are various amendment
provisions of the Bill of Rights that require use of federal standards in
order to assure their protection, this may not be true in all cases. For
example, as stated by Justice Fortas:
Jury trial is more than a principle of justice applicable to individual cases. It
is a system of administration of the business of the State. While we may believe
(and I do believe) that the right of jury trial is fundamental, it does not follow
that the particulars of according that right must be uniform. We should be
ready to welcome state variations which do not impair-indeed, which may advance
-the theory and purpose of trial by jury.80 (emphasis added.)
It is apparent that there will be some adoption of federal standards, but
only in those areas where the standard itself is the right to be protected. 8'
Incorporation thus does not by itself necessitate a wholesale adoption,
without rhyme or reason, of evolutionary federal procedural development.
The Court's decree is that existing federal laws, extended under the Due
Process Clause, function as a "governor" rather than a "straight-jacket".
Further, as the Court does not read the Fourteenth Amendment as a
mere restatement of the Bill of Rights, it does not necessarily follow that
by adopting the doctrine of incorporation the Court has stated that no
privileges exist which may be violated other than those specifically provided
for in the first ten amendments. Nothing in the Court's language so
restricts the operation of the Due Process Clause. Rather, in acknowledg-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment as intending to protect "fundamental"
rights long recognized under the common law system, 82 the doctrine of
incorporation merely recognizes the Bill of Rights as part, but not the en-
tire scope of due process. The amendments are a definitive part of the
due process concept to which the Court can refer for stability and predicta-
80 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 214-15 (1968). Justice Fortas' concurring
opinion in Bloom applies also to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), previously
decided.
81 For those amendment provisions declared to be enforced against the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment according to federal standards, see Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Sixth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth
Amendment right to counsel); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (First
Amendment freedom of religion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (First
Amendment freedom of speech and press).
82 395 U.S. at 794-95.
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bility.83 This does not preclude the Palko rationale from existing as an
addition, rather than a competing alternative, to incorporation. The in-
corporation theory, much less the specific incorporation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege here, does not necessarily preclude the operation of the
Due Process Clause in the traditional sense, expressd in Palko, as a check
against state procedural violations of a fair trial. In this sense, individuals
threatened by state action are availed of a double measure of protection
-the Palko due process protection and the specific guarantees of incorpora-
tion.84
Justice Harlan's concern is with retaining the Due Process Clause as an
independent guide to equitable principles.8 5 By this interpretation, the Due
Process Clause constantly requires the Court "to re-examine fundamental
principles and at the same time enjoins it from reading its own preferences
into the Constitution. '8  There is no reason why the Due Process Clause
should not continue to function as a means of re-examining general principles
of justice, while also providing for specific application of amendments to
the states. The aims of incorporation, and Justice Harlan's case-by-case
"fundamental fairness" standard, do not appear inconsistent. Both con-
cepts recognize that the Constitution as framed did not anticipate the prob-
lems of today's society. Constant reinterpretation is therefore required to
best provide those general protections which the amendments were originally
drafted to ensure.
Seen in this light, incorporation is not per se destructive of federalism.
The present Court has taken great pains to ensure this result. Federalism,
although altered, still remains a vital force. The essence here is that,
consistent with demands of the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism may not
83 A major objection to the practice of relying upon the Due Process Clause as
authority for extending constitutional guarantees is that the concept is too vague.
'This court has never attempted to define with precision the words 'due process of
law'.... It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union
may disregard." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
The question has been phrased whether there are "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); whether they are "basic in our system of juris-
prudence", ln re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); and whether they are "fundamental
right[s], essential to a fair trial", Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
84 Another avenue may also exist. The incorporation theory may coincide with
the Penumbra theory expressed by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). Under that view, protection against state action is guaranteed a
defendant even though no specific Bill of Rights amendment is expressly on point.
When the effect of the amendments is to cast a penumbra or shadow broader than
the sum of specific narrowly drawn guarantees, indeed there may be little difference
between this position and the incorporation theory.
85 See Justice Harlan's dissent in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
88 Id. at 28-29.
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substantially prejudice a defendant merely because of the fortuity of dif-
fering federal and state jurisdiction.
June E. Console
